Free World Order Essay Sample
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It is impossible to prevent most of the world from being subject to violence, injustice, poverty, and disorder for at least several more generations. But we believe that a process is well started that will make most of the world peaceful, democratic, and wealthy by historical standards by about a century from now, or perhaps two. But since people's lives are shorter than a century, our view of the world also says that billions of human beings are doomed to have their lives cut short or mutilated by poverty, tyranny, and violence. Some may see this view as pessimistic, because a century is such a long time. People care less about labels such as "optimist" or "pessimist" than about the implications for action. The specter of suffering, injustice, and unnecessary death in the zones of turmoil is a goad to action, even though they are mostly temporary and partly unavoidable evils. The tasks of speeding the spread of wealth, democracy, and peace The inference we draw from our "optimistic" view, that each part of the world is now richer and safer, is that people can afford, and have a responsibility, to speed the day when more of the world will be richer and safer (Parish, 2001). The world order presents a perspective that makes it possible not only to balance "the best of times and the worst of times" but to understand how the current world order will work. There is always some kind of world order, although usually it is not very orderly. The world order may be more or less stable, lawful, decent, or violent, but there is always some pattern of forces and relationships that determines how the critical decisions are made in the world. The opposite of orderly in this sense is not anarchic but random or unpredictable.
The term world order as the society uses it signifies an analytic structure that makes possible understanding and prediction, hence policy and diplomacy. Like the old order, the current world order (or the new world disorder, as some are complaining recently) will be based on the system of states, although forces and arrangements that are international or sub-national will have increasing importance. But, within the broad structure, new patterns, not based on military power, will be increasingly important. Now, as in the past, quality is more important than quantity, for both military and economic success. A high-quality military force from an advanced society can defeat a larger military force from a more primitive society. The exact ratio depends on particulars, but now, as in the past, the ratio can in some circumstances be very high (even 10 to 1). Military power depends, in addition to equipment, on the training, discipline, organization, and strategy of the troops and officers and on the intelligence, initiative, and motivation of all personnel. The highest military performance demands the same human and social qualities required for building a productive economy. So a society that cannot operate the highest-quality economy cannot operate the highest-quality fighting force. What can be meant by suggesting that there has been a qualitative revolution that makes the world different? In addition to the ages-long advantage of quality over quantity, modern technology confers more decisive advantages. Figuratively, those nations that cannot produce and program missiles to fly around buildings on their way to hitting their precise targets are no longer serious military competitors against those who can. The quality/quantity gap is now more absolute, making it very difficult, if not impossible, for quantity to overcome quality and will. Although quality can become so complacent that it becomes vulnerable to being out-witted, it now enjoys a decisive advantage.
Why is it believed that this world order will be different than any of those that have preceded it? For one thing, the world's major democracies (if not exactly "the good guys," at least "the less-worse guys") have a near monopoly on the most effective military force. Not even a wholly unlikely alliance of all the world's dictatorships would be strong enough to defeat the United States, let alone the world's democracies. Modern technology and productivity make a drastic difference in how defeat and victory are counted. Whereas, in the past, a country became victorious by conquering more people or more resources, now such victories are self-defeating. Only countries with high-quality populations and institutions are worth taking, precisely those nations--for example, Taiwan, Switzerland, Japan--that are the least likely targets for successful military aggression. The two propositions together--the overall qualitative revolution and the military dominance of democracies--explain why we believe that the United States will follow what might be called the "reverse domino theory," namely it will multi-lateralize its military and economic intervention in the rest of the world. It will seek to moderate the behaviour of feckless countries by filtering its activities through a variety of multilateral agencies and groups. In short, what some opponents of American military intervention have long wanted has, with the end of the cold war, become a reality. The words are not there yet, but the multilateral music is playing for all to hear (Wells, 2006). It can be described that the current world order will be different than the one with which we are familiar, old thinking using outdated assumptions will produce poor policy and will miss opportunities. It is assume that once they appreciate the nature of the current world order as it is described, others can do new thinking at least as well as the society can, but we believe that the fundamental features of the current world order.
In 1989, a great conflict that had persisted for more than four decades, and that was expected to continue for decades to come, suddenly ended in a victory that was as sweeping as it was unexpected. There probably will be plenty of national and other conflict in the zones of peace, but the decisive special characteristic of this conflict is that no one will believe that it can lead to war. Moreover, the countries in the zones of peace and democracy will have most of the power in the world, so they will not face a serious threat to their national survival or freedom, regardless of the outcome of conflicts in the other zones. The fact that today England, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, and the United States cannot imagine going to war with each other again does not mean that they never will (Henig, 1997). But it does mean that in these countries there will not be political support for any major program that depends on the possibility of war with one of the other members of the "big six." This practical political conclusion--with which few people would disagree- would have major implications even if the circumstances were just a temporary phase, and it will be argued that it is much more. World order is about peace and chaos and there are different ways as to how it can be changed for the greater benefits and the welfare of the people living in the social matrix. The changing of the world order, on the other hand, is not an easy thing to do as it entails changes from the top positions of the government to the lowest ranking individual in the society. There should be an equal distribution of power between every person in the society and that each individual should learn to respect each other in order to attain peace and unity (Marrs, 2008).
Some security experts believe that the current absence of the danger of war within the "big six" is a short-term phenomenon and that prudent national security planning requires each country to take into account the possibility of war with any other major power. Of course one or more of the big-six democracies could change character and become a security threat to the others, or perhaps go to war with another without having changed character. But the likelihood of such a war is too remote to influence policy. It would be false prudence for any of the big six to build policy on the basis of the possibility of war with another member of the group. Since the United States and the other great democracies will benefit significantly by recognizing the new reality that not every power is a potential enemy, they should put aside the classic military principle of paying attention to capabilities, not intentions (Spargo, 1921). Even the most cautious protector of national security in the big six should make policy on the assumption that there is no longer a need to consider the possibility of war with another member of that group. If the need arises later, there will be enough time to change policy. The bottom line is this: Since the countries in the zones of peace will no longer take seriously the possibility of going to war with one another, the current world order is different from all previous ones. A key reason why the zones of peace can be expected to have internal peace is that all the countries in these zones are modern democracies. A central pillar of this world order is that the modern democracies will not go to war with one another. Hence, it is important to know that the world order is all about the zones of peace and war (Frenster, 2008).